I  would  like  to  raise  some  issues  about   the  extreme
conservation measures that would be required by a sudden,  severe and
prolonged supply interruption  in liquid fuels.  My  reference crisis
involves the sudden reduction of  liquid fuel use in the U.S.  to one
quarter  its  present  value  and  lasts  until  a  crash  program of
production of synthetic fuels, increased recovery and substitution by
nuclear and  coal-generated electricity restores  equilibrium between
demand  and the  new cost  of production.   The reason  for supposing
liquid fuels to be reduced to one quarter is that we now  import half
our  liquid fuels,  and  I assume  this production  lost.   I further
suppose that during the crisis we export to our worse off allies half
of the liquid fuels we  produce including half of the  new production
of synthetics as it comes on line.  I suppose we export half, because
that does our allies half the maximum good we could do; we  could not
do  qualitatively better.           Such a  crisis would  disrupt our
economy and many workers could not continue their  jobs.  Conversely,
vast manpower, e.g.,  automobile workers and college  students, would
be  available  to  build  synthetic  fuel  production  facilities, to
convert plants to  coal and finish  the nuclear backlog.   The crisis
would probably be  as disruptive as World  War II to our  economy and
last as long,  i.e., four years.           Ending the crisis  in four
years by a "production  miracle" requires that, our  mobilization for
production be as prompt and smooth as our World War  II mobilization.
This requires  that our  political energies  go mainly  into enacting
adequate measures  for the  mobilization and  not into  fighting each
other.          This will be difficult but not impossible.   In 1973,
each group in  society continued to say  what it had been  saying all
along - only  louder.  Here are  some considerations relating  to the
emergency conservation program.           1. The initial  crisis will
hit  different parts  of  the country  differently.   Most oil-heated
houses may have to be temporarily closed up, children and  other non-
workers  evacuated  to  the   South  and  houses  near   work  places
temporarily converted  to rooming houses.           2.  Some  ways of
implementing the required combination of rationing and  pricing would
exacerbate internal  conflicts, and others  would mobilize  effort to
restore  normality.    ↓-The  plan-↓should   be  based   on  whatever
understanding  we  can  acquire  about  which  is  which.          3.
Acceptance of hardship requires that restoration of normality  be the
perceived good.          4.  The  level of hardship might be  more or
less than that  endured by American  civilians  in World War  II.  It
would  not  approach  that  endured  by  British,   Japanese,  German
civilians  and  would  be  nowhere near  that  endured  in  Russia or
occupied Europe.          5.  It would be good if we could  prepare a
contingency  plan that  Congress could  vote on  now.   However, this
seems  unlikely for  two reasons;               First, we  don't know
what the crisis will be like.  On the one hand             it  may be
less   severe  or   prolonged  and   on  the   other  hand,   it  may



involve  additional  complications  like  war.                Second,
Congress   could  not   pay  the   political  costs,   including  the
breaking of  longstanding coalitions and  forming new ones,  in order
to  decide hypothetical  questions.  In  particular it  would require
moderates on both sides of present economic and  environmental issues
to break with the extremists  who provide their best troops  in order
to  reach  a compromise.   The  political blood  spilled  to  solve a
presently hypothetical  issue would be  real blood  not hypothetical.
6    Nevertheless,  some  political  prepaaration  may  be  possible.
Perhaps we could agree on a plan with two undecided  parameters.  One
parameter would be on the liberal--conservative  political dimension,
e.g., the amount of  a tax on profits  or the magnitude of  an income
equalization  measure.   The   second  parameter  would  be   on  the
environment  vs. growth  axis, e.g.,  the amount  of  compromise with
environmental standards.  Agrement on the parametrized plan  might be
obtained now, because, for  example, a conservative would  be pleased
with the plan if only the liberal-conservative panel came out "right"
enough,  and  the  liberal  would  like  the  plan  if  it  came  out
sufficiently to the "left."           When the crisis  came, Congress
would  fight it  out according  to the  strength at  the time  of the
contending views and set the values of the parameters.  The alliances
would be broken and reformed  and the political blood shed,  but less
time would  be required  than if every  detail had  to be  fought out
along   liberal-conservative   and   environment-growth   dimensions.
This idea may  be hopelessly naive in  its present form,  but perhaps
some     elements     of     it     will     be     found     usable.
John McCarthy   MAIN POINTS    1.   Which measures  generate internal
cooperation and which conflict.     2.  A plan with open political or
ideological parameters.